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Department of State TELEGRAM

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ACTION: EA-15

INFO OCT-01 EUR-20 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05 H-02 INR-07 L-04

NSAE-00 NSC-10 P-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SS-20 USIA-12 UPW-01

RSR-01 /103 W

R 080350Z MAY 70
FM AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 723
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMCONSUL HONG KONG

CONFIDENTIAL PHNOM PENH

1. EMBOFF MET WITH FIRST SECRETARY OF SOVIET EMBASSY (KHAMIDOU LINE) LATE AFTERNOON MAY 6 TO DISCUSS CHINESE ACTION, PRESIDENT'S SPEECH AND GENERAL SITUATION. (KHAMIDOU LINE HAD VISITED EMBASSY MAY 2 TO REQUEST TEXT OF PRESIDENT'S SPEECH.)

2. CONCERNING CHINESE RECOGNITION OF SIHANOUK GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE, KHAMIDOU LINE SAID THAT SOVIET ACTION WOULD BE DECIDED IN MOSCOW AND THAT ONE WOULD SEE. HE NOTED THAT "SUPER-POWERS" CONCERNED THEMSELVES WITH THINGS ON A GLOBAL BASIS AND THAT THEY DID NOT REACT AS QUICKLY AS OTHER COUNTRIES.

3. IN GENERAL DISCUSSION OF SITUATION HE SAID, "OBJECTIVELY, THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT IS MORE FAVORABLE FROM THE USG POINT OF VIEW." HE WENT ON, HOWEVER, TO STATE THAT WHAT US WAS DOING IN INDO-CHINA WAS TO MAKE IT EASIER FOR CHINA. IT WAS PREFERABLE, HE SAID, TO HAVE A VIETNAMESE INDO-CHINA, THAT A CHINESE ONE. THE FORMER, COULD PROVIDE SOME KIND OF BARRIER, HOWEVER WEAK, TO CHINESE EXPANSIONISM.

4. KHAMIDOU LINE WONDERED IF AMERICANS WOULD WITHDRAW, AND EMBOFF POINTED OUT THAT PRESIDENT HAD SAID THEY WOULD. EMBOFF EXPLAINED REASON FOR NECESSITY OF ACTION. KHAMIDOU LINE DID NOT BOTHER TO REFUTE NUMEROUS REFERENCES TO NVN/VC TROOPS IN CAMBODIA AND TO NVN TROOPS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. HE DID NOTE THERE WERE ANTI-GOVERNMENTAL FORCES HERE. HE HAD SEEN THEM, HE SAID. EMBOFF NOTED THAT THESE FORCES

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REVIEWED BY Trubley DATE 10/9/80

RDS ☐ or XDS ☐ EXT. DATE _____

TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐

~~SECRET~~ CLASSIFIED ☒ RELEASABLE ☒

RELEASE DENIED ☐



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ONLY SEEMED TO BE ACTIVE IN NVN/VC OCCUPIED AREAS OR AREAS WHERE THERE WAS A HIGH CONCENTRATION OF VIETNAMESE. SOV OFFICER DID NOT PRESS HIS VIEWPOINT.

5. KHAMIDOUINE NOTED "COINCIDENCES" OF AMERICAN TROOPS ENTERING CAMBODIA, OF MAY 1, 2 AND 3 SUPPRESSIVE AIR ATTACKS IN NVN (HE PERSONALLY THOUGHT NUMBERS OF AIRCRAFT USED EXCESSIVE AND REFLECTED EMOTIONAL MILITARY REACTION. SIX OR SEVEN AIRCRAFT, HE SAID, HE COULD UNDERSTAND), AND OF SECDEF'S PRESS CONFERENCE, REPORTS FROM WHICH ALLEGED THAT SECDEF HELD OPEN POSSIBILITY OF RESUMPTION OF BOMBING OF NVN. HE NOTED THAT DENIAL HAD FOLLOWED PRESS CONFERENCE, BUT WONDERED IF THIS WAS TRIAL BALLOON. AS ANALYST, HE SAID, THESE EVENTS COULD NOT BUT BE MARKED. EMBOFF SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE KNEW, THEY WERE UNCONNECTED AND THAT HE UNDERSTOOD SECDEF HAD GIVEN HYPOTHETICAL REPLY TO HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION AND HAD NOT ELABORATED ON PRESIDENT'S SPEECH IN ANY WAY.

6. KHAMIDOUINE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THESE SHARP SIGNALS WERE NOT WAY TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE NORTH VIETNAMESE. (KHAMIDOUINE SPENT 4 YEARS IN

HANOI (1961-1965). ASKED HOW ONE DID NEGOTIATE, HE SAID THEY HAD TO BE TREATED AS PARTNERS. I SAID THAT I THOUGHT THAT WE WERE DOING SO IN PARIS, AND REVIEWED THE ACTIONS THE USG HAD TAKEN TO INDICATE ITS SERIOUS INTENTION TO NEGOTIATE. KHAMIDOUINE COMMENTED THAT DURING THE NEGOTIATION PERIOD, WHICH HE CONSIDERS BEGAN OVER TWO YEARS AGO IN NOVEMBER 1967, THERE HAD BEEN MISTAKES AND HE WOULD NOT ASSIGN THEM TO ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER.

7. IN PASSING HE REMARKED BRIEFLY ON CIA INVOLVEMENT IN DEPOSITION OF SIHANOUK AS MENTIONED IN PRESS, EMBOFF SAID HE HOPED SOVIETS HAD BETTER INFORMATION SOURCES THAN PRESS.

COMMENT: KHAMIDOUINE DISCUSSES MATTERS NON-POLEMICALLY. WHEN CONVERSATION BEGINS TO TOUCH ON MATTERS ON WHICH USG AND SOVIETS HOLD DIFFERING VIEWS, HE REMARKS THAT THIS IS THE CASE AND SUGGESTS ONE NOT REPEAT KNOWN POSITIONS. GP-4. RIVES

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